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Abstract
Consensus is one of the most fundamental distributed
computing problems. In particular, it serves as
a building block in many replication based fault-
tolerant systems and in particular in multiple recent
blockchain solutions. Depending on its exact variant
and other environmental assumptions, solving con-
sensus requires multiple communication rounds. Yet,
there are known optimistic protocols that guarantee
termination in a single communication round under
favorable conditions.
In this paper we present a generic optimizer than
can turn any consensus protocol into an optimized
protocol that terminates in a single communication
round whenever all nodes start with the same prede-
termined value and no Byzantine failures occur (al-
though node crashes are allowed). This is regardless
of the network timing assumptions and additional or-
acle capabilities assumed by the base consensus pro-
tocol being optimized.
In the case of benign failures, our optimizer works
whenever the number of faulty nodes f < n/2. For
Byzantine behavior, our optimizer’s resiliency de-
pends on the validity variant sought. In the case
of classical validity, it can accommodate f < n/4
Byzantine failures. With the more recent exter-
nal validity function assumption, it works whenever
f < n/3. Either way, our optimizer only relies on oral
messages, thereby imposing very light-weight crypto
requirements.
1 Introduction
Consensus [18] is one of the most studied problems
in distributed computing [2, 21]. This is because any
kind of coordination requires reaching an agreement.
Also, in replicated systems, nodes generally need to
agree on the order in which updates are applied to the
system in order to maintain a consistent state. Yet,
despite its simplicity and intuitive appeal, several im-
possibility results daunt researchers and designers of
distributed systems. First and foremost, the semi-
nal FLP results proves that consensus is not solvable
in asynchronous distributed environments in which a
single process may fail by crashing [12]. Also, lower
bounds have been shown on the number of commu-
nication rounds needed to solve consensus [15, 19] as
well as inherent tradeoffs between the availability and
consistency of distributed systems [4].
Yet, it has been noted that in various settings some
conditions are more likely to hold than others. This
has led to the development of various optimistic con-
sensus protocols that terminate quickly when certain
favorable conditions hold. These may include lack of
failures, or at least lack of certain types of failures,
periods of network synchrony in an asynchronous net-
work, as well as the composition of the proposed val-
ues.
In this work we explore the impact of assuming
that one specific value is more likely to be pro-
posed by all correct nodes. For example, in several
blockchain protocols, the protocol can be viewed as
repeatedly having a leader proposing a block and then
all nodes running a binary consensus protocol for de-
ciding whether to accept this value [6, 7, 11]. Hence,
in the “common case” where there are no failures and
the network behaves in a synchronous manner during
that block generation process, all nodes will vote to
accept the proposed block. Similarly, in a control sys-
tem one can expect that under normal operating con-
ditions all correct replicas will usually propose taking
the same course of action as all are exposed to the
same system state and sensor readings [23].
To that end, we develop a generic optimizer for
consensus protocols which always terminates in a sin-
gle communication round when all nodes propose the
same a-priory preferred value v and no Byzantine fail-
ures manifest (yet, they can be tolerated). Specifi-
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cally, our optimizer can be applied to both the benign
failures and Byzantine failures models and is inde-
pendent of any other network and oracle assumptions
needed by the base consensus protocol it optimizes.
In the case of benign failures, we only require that
the number of faulty nodes is bounded by f < n/2.
Here, whenever all nodes propose the same predefined
value, the optimizer will always terminate in a single
all-to-all communication round.
For the Byzantine failure model, we distinguish
between two definitions of the consensus problem,
one that is based on classical Byzantine validity vs.
the more recently proposed external validity defini-
tion [8]. For classical validity, our optimizer requires
f < n/4 and always terminates in one communication
round whenever all nodes propose the same antici-
pated value and no Byzantine failures occur. Further,
when Byzantine failure do occur, the termination and
safety of the overall construction is upheld.
When the consensus definition requires external va-
lidity, our optimizer can tolerate f < n/3. Under the
assumption that either there is only two possible valid
proposed values (binary consensus), or that the base
protocol satisfies classical validity, our optimizer al-
ways terminates in one communication round when-
ever all nodes propose the same anticipated value and
no Byzantine failures occur. As before, the overall
correctness is maintained even when Byzantine fail-
ures do occur.
Note that sometimes the external validity function
requires proposed values to carry a cryptocraphic
proof. As cryptographic proofs are expected to be
much larger than the value itself, we can further
reduce the communication cost of the protocol in
the optimistic phase by only broadcasting the val-
ues themselves in the first phase. Only if no decision
can be made after the first phase, then the proofs
are being broadcast so they can be fed to the validity
functions. This means an additional communication
phase when the first optimistic phase fails, but sig-
nificantly smaller messages when the first phase suc-
ceeds. Hence, this last optimization is beneficial in
situations where the first phase is likely to succeed in
the vast majority of consensus invocations (and the
proofs are substantially larger than values).
One critical requirement when dealing with Byzan-
tine failures is to disallow impersonation, which is
often ensured through cryptography. There are
two common models for preventing impersonation,
namely oral messages and signed messages. Oral
messages can only guarantee to a receiver of a mes-
sage which node has sent the message. Hence, it can
be implemented using MAC tags. In practice, this
can be made transparent to the application by uti-
lizing transport level secure communication such as
TLS, HTTPS, etc. Signed messages, on the other
hand, include a publicly verifiable signature of the
sender on the value being sent. This enables one
node to prove to another node that it has received
a certain value from a given third party. Hence, the
signature must be explicitly generated by the ap-
plication’s code, and requires either private/public
key signatures and verification, or attaching a vector
of MAC tags, one for each node, on each message.
In other words, signed messages are more expensive
and cumbersome to use. Our optimizer only requires
oral messages when dealing with Byzantine failures.
Hence, its cryptography related space and CPU time
are minimal.
Finally, we also show a lower bound on the mini-
mal resiliency required to terminate in one communi-
cation round in the Byzantine failure model subject
to classical validity. Specifically, we show that for
classical validity there is no asynchronous Byzantine
consensus protocol that can ensure termination in one
communication round after receiving only n−f mes-
sages when n = 3f + 1.
Summary of contributions: We develop a
generic optimizer that ensures fast termination in one
communication round when all processes start with
the same value and Byzantine failures do not mani-
fest. We instantiate the optimizer for both the benign
and Byzantine failure model with optimal resiliency
and formally prove their correctness. We also show a
resiliency lower bound for such fast termination in the
Byzantine failure model for solving consensus with
classical validity.
Paper Organization The rest of this paper is or-
ganized as follows: We survey other optimized con-
sensus protocols in Section 2. The formal model and
problems statements appear in Section 3. We present
our generic optimizer in Section 4 and show the lower
bound in Section 5. Finally, we conclude with a dis-
cussion in Section 6.
2 Related Work
The first work to explore one communication round
consensus in the benign failure model is [5]. The ba-
sic protocol in [5] requires f < n/3. That protocol
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is also extended to support a preferred value which
improves the resiliency requirement to f < n/2, sim-
ilar to our work. The main contribution of this paper
compared to [5] is in our exploration of this prob-
lem under Byzantine failures and in the fact that
we present a single generic optimizer for both failure
models.
The work of [14] explored simple Byzantine consen-
sus protocols that can terminate in a single communi-
cation round whenever all nodes start with the same
value and certain failures do not manifest. Yet, the
probabilistic protocol of [14] required f < n/5 while
their deterministic protocol needed f < n/6. In con-
trast, our optimizer when instantiated to Byzantine
failures can withstand up to f < n/4 with the classi-
cal validity definition (and f < n/3 with external va-
lidity, which was not explored in [14]). This is due to
biasing the consensus into preferring a certain value.
The price that we pay compared to [14] is that if all
nodes start with the non-preferable value and the re-
spective failures do not manifest, the protocol in [14]
would terminate in a single communication step while
our optimizer would have to invoke the full protocol.
Traditional deterministic Byzantine consensus pro-
tocols, most notably PBFT [9] require at least 3 com-
munication rounds to terminate. Multiple works that
reduce this number have been published, each pre-
senting a unique optimization. The Q/U work pre-
sented a client driven protocol [1] which enables ter-
mination in two communication rounds when favor-
able conditions are met. Yet, its resiliency require-
ment is f < n/5, compared to our f < n/4 for
the classical validity and f < n/3 for external va-
lidity. The HQ work improved the resiliency of Q/U
to f < n/3, yet does not perform well under high net-
work load [10]. Also, our optimizer is generic whereas
Q/U and HQ are specialized solutions, each tailored
to its intricate protocol.
The Fast Byzantine Consensus (FaB) protocol was
the first protocol to implement a Byzantine con-
sensus protocol that terminates in two communica-
tion phases in the normal case while requiring f <
n/5 [19]. The normal case in [19] is defined as when
there is a unique correct leader, all correct acceptors
agree on its identity, and the system is in a period
of synchrony. This protocol translates into a 3 phase
state machine replication protocol. Another variant
can accommodate n ≥ 3f + 2b + 1, where b ≤ f is
the upper bound on non-leaders suffering Byzantine
failures.
Zyzzyva is a client driven protocol [16] which ter-
minates after 3 communication rounds (including the
communication between the client and the replicas)
whenever the client receives identical replies from all
3f + 1 replicas. Our optimizer obtains termination
in a single communication round among the replicas
even when upto f of them may crush or be slow. This
is by relying on all-to-all communication, and ensur-
ing fast termination only when the preferred value is
included in the first n−f replies. Also, our optimizer
is generic while Zyzzyva and FaB are specialized so-
lutions.
A generic construction for optimized Byzantine
consensus protocols appears in [3] along with its
Aliph and Azyzzyva instantiations. The construction
in [3] enables switching between Byzantine consen-
sus protocols depending on the changing environment
conditions in a safe manner. In particular, it is pos-
sible to switch from an optimistic fast protocol that
fails to terminate to a recovery protocol that would
ensure overall correctness. Both Aliph and Azyzzyva
are client driven protocols, which require receiving
timely identical replies from all 3f+1 replicas. Hence,
our optimizer can terminate quickly in worse environ-
ment conditions if the preferred value is also the one
supported by most nodes.
The condition based approach for solving consen-
sus identifies various sets of input values that enable
solving consensus fast [20]. This is by treating the set
of input values held by all processes as an input vector
to the problem. Specifically, the work in [13] showed
that when the possible input vectors correspond to
error correcting codes, then consensus is solvable in a
single communication round regardless of synchrony
assumptions.
3 Preliminaries
Basics: We consider a distributed system consist-
ing of n nodes communicating by sending messages
over a network. We assume that the network main-
tains integrity, meaning that messages delivered by
the network were indeed sent by their claimed sender
and that their content is not corrupted. The level
of reliability of the network defines which portions
and under which circumstances messages sent be-
tween two nodes must be delivered by the network.
Additionally, the level of synchrony is the system de-
fines if and what type of bounds exist on the latency
between sending a message and its recipient and
whether nodes have access to clocks and if so, how
synchronized these clocks are. Our optimizer mecha-
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nism only requires that during its optimizing phase,
messages transmitted between two correct nodes (to
be defined shortly) are eventually delivered. In par-
ticular, we do not assume anything about the syn-
chrony of the system. When the base protocol we are
optimizing is invoked, the network reliability and syn-
chronization assumptions under which that protocol
was designed to work must hold.
Failure Modesl and Resiliency: Out of the n
nodes in the system, up to f nodes may be faulty
while the others are correct. In the benign failure
model, nodes may only fail by crashing, i.e., they
might halt their execution. In the Byzantine fail-
ures model, faulty nodes may deviate arbitrarily from
their protocol. Yet, given our integrity assumptions,
nodes may not impersonate each other. In particular,
we assume that there are no Sybil attacks. The ratio
between f and n is known as the resiliency level of
the system. The level of synchrony, reliability, fail-
ure model, and the problem being addressed all im-
pact the maximal level of resiliency that can be ob-
tained [21].
Cryptography is a common way to thwart imper-
sonation. Here we can distinguish between the oral
messages model and the signed messages model. Oral
messages can only ensure to the receiver that the mes-
sage it received from the network was indeed sent by
its claimed sender. In practice, this can be imple-
mented using MACs, which are relatively cheap, and
is often made transparent to the protocol’s code by
relying on secure transport protocols such as TLS or
HTTPS. Signed messages enable verifying that a spe-
cific value was sent by a specific node, and hence can
be used to securely pass values through intermedi-
ary nodes, or verify that the same value was sent to
all nodes. In practice, the signed messages model is
typically implemented through asymmetric key cryp-
tography [22] or attaching vectors of MAC tags [9].
Our optimizer mechanism only requires oral messages
(in the Byzantine failures model).
Benign Consensus: As mentioned before, in this
paper we address the consensus problem. We start
with the common definition of consensus in the be-
nign failure model and then extend it to the Byzan-
tine failure model. In the consensus problem each
node pi has an initial value vi, also known as the pro-
posed value of pi. The nodes must each decide on a
value such that:
Validity Any decided value must be proposed by
some process.
Agreement All correct processes decide on the same
value.
Termination Every correct process eventually de-
cides.
Byzantine Consensus: When Byzantine failures
are considered, the value proposed by a Byzantine
process is somewhat meaningless, since a Byzantine
node may propose an arbitrary value and even pre-
tend to propose different values to different nodes.
Hence, a common approach for defining Byzantine
consensus is to require:
Byzantine Validity If all correct processes propose
the same value, then this is the only value that
can be decided.
Byzantine Agreement Same as agreement.
Byzantine Termination Same as termination.
External Validity Byzantine Consensus: A
shortcoming of Byzantine validity is that whenever
not all correct nodes start with the same value, any
value may be decided. Further, in some applications,
such as blockchains, even a Byzantine node may pro-
pose a value that is valid w.r.t. the systems goals.
This leads to the definition of external validity Byzan-
tine consensus [8]. Here, one assumes an external
boolean validity function valid(v) whose output is
true iff v is a valid proposed value and requires:
Byzantine External Validity Any decided value
v must satisfy valid(v) = true.
Byzantine Agreement Same as agreement.
Byzantine Termination Same as termination.
4 The Biased Optimizer
We present the generic optimizer in Section 4.1. This
is followed by the instantiates to the various failure
models: the benign failure model is discussed in Sec-
tion 4.2, Byzantine failures with classic validity are
handled in Section 4.3, while Byzantine failures with
external validity are addressed in Section 4.4.
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Algorithm 1 v-Biased Optimizer – code for p
1: procedureOptimizedConsensusv,Consensus,AdoptionCriteria(v′)
2: broadcast(v′)
3: wait until n− f proposals vˆ have been received
4: votes = {received proposals}
5: if votes = {v} then
6: Decide v
7: Return v
8: if votes matches AdoptionCriteria then
9: Return Consensus.Propose(v)
10: else
11: Return Consensus.Propose(v′)
12:
13: if invoked Decide v and some node invoked
Consensus.Propose(vˆ) then
14: Consensus.Propose(v) . this is executed at most once
4.1 Generic Optimizer
Algorithm 1 depicts the pseudocode for the generic
optimizer algorithm from the point of view of node
p. Initially, each node broadcast its proposed value
to all others (Line 2)1. Next, each node waits un-
til it receives at least n − f proposals from distinct
nodes. If all these values are the same as the biased
value, the node decides v and returns. Otherwise,
if the received proposals match an adoption criteria
(AdoptionCriteria) for the value v, the local node
invokes the standard consensus protocol with a value
v (Line 9). Otherwise, the standard consensus proto-
col is invoked with the originally proposed value for
the local node u (Line 11). Finally, if a node p has
already decided in the optimistic phase, but it no-
tices that the standard consensus protocol has been
invoked by another process (Line 14), then p invokes
the consensus with the value v (the only one p could
have decided on). This is in order to ensure that
enough nodes participate in the standard consensus
protocol to enable its termination.
4.2 Instantiation to Benign Failures
For benign failures, the failure resiliency is 1/2 − ,
that is, we assume f < n/2. The AdoptionCriteria
is simply to check whether the collection of received
votes includes at least one instance of the biased value
v. Here, if at least one node has received only (the
preferred) v values in Line 3, the only value it might
decide on is v. The worst that can happen is that all
other f nodes started with a different value, as illus-
trated in Figure 1. Yet, by the resiliency assumption,
1 Here the term broadcast is equivalent to sending the same
message point-to-point to all other nodes.
Figure 1: A worst case scenario for the benign failure
model and f < n/2. If some node p decides after
receiving f + 1 votes for v, then any other node q
must receive at least one instance of v.
in this case any other node must have received at
least one v proposal. Hence, all nodes would invoke
the base consensus protocol with v and by the validity
and termination conditions of the consensus protocol
would decide v.
In no node receives n − f values of v, then it is
clear that the standard consensus protocol would be
invoked by each node with a value that was proposed
by some node. Hence, validity would be preserved as
well. The formal proof is given below.
Lemma 4.2.1. The protocol listed in Algorithm 1
satisfies termination as long as f < n/2.
Proof. As can be seen from the code, as long as
f < n/2, the protocol either decides and returns
in Line 6 or invokes the base consensus protocol in
Lines 9 or 11. If at least one node invokes the base
consensus protocol, then by Line 14 all nodes invoke
this protocol (once). Hence, by the termination of
the base consensus protocol, Algorithm 1 also termi-
nates.
Lemma 4.2.2. The protocol listed in Algorithm 1
satisfies validity.
Proof. Clearly from the code, the value decided in
Line 6 is proposed by some (in fact by multiple)
node(s). Similarly, if a value is adopted by the
AdoptionCriteria, it is also proposed by some node.
Hence, all invocations of the base consensus protocol
in Lines 9 or 11 are with values proposed by some
node. By the validity of the base consensus protocol,
overall validity is satisfied.
Lemma 4.2.3. The protocol listed in Algorithm 1
satisfies agreement.
Proof. Since there is only one preferred value v, if all
nodes decide v in Line 6 then they all decide on the
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Figure 2: A worst case scenario for the Byzantine
failure model with classic validity and f < n/4. If
some node p decides after receiving n − f votes for
v, then any other node q must receive at least f + 1
votes for v.
same value (v). Similarly, if all nodes decide by invok-
ing the base consensus protocol in Lines 9 or 11, then
by the agreement property of this protocol all nodes
decide on the same value. Hence, the only poten-
tial violation of agreement is if some nodes decide in
Line 6 while others invoke the base consensus proto-
col in Lines 9 or 11. Suppose node p decides in Line 6.
In this case, it has received at least n− f votes for v.
Suppose all missing votes are u and some other node
q has received these u votes. However, as f < n/2, q
must receive at least 1 vote for v and therefore would
adopt v by the AdoptionCriteria2. As this applies
to any q, all nodes that invoke the base consensus
protocol in Lines 9 or 11 invoke it with v. Hence, by
the validity property of this protocol only v can be
decided so overall agreement is also satisfied.
From Lemmas 4.2.1, 4.2.2 and 4.2.3, we immedi-
ately have the following theorem:
Theorem 4.2.1. The protocol listed in Algorithm 1
solves consensus when up to f < n/2 nodes may fail
by crashing.
4.3 Byzantine Failures with Classical
Validity
For the Byzantine failure model with classical va-
lidity, we provide a resiliency of 1/4 − , i..e, f <
n/4. Here, the AdoptionCriteria is simply to check
whether the collection of received votes includes at
least f + 1 instances of the preferred value v.
Intuitively, if at least f+1 nodes broadcast v, then
we know that at least one correct node proposed v
and therefore v can be decided on in terms of valid-
ity. On the other hand, if some node decided due to
receiving n − f values v, then it is possible that the
2 Notice that if in some execution the number of faulty
nodes surpasses the assumed upper bound f , then the protocol
would be stuck in Line 3 and agreement would be trivially
preserved.
other f were simply late but all of them proposed
value u. In this case, another node might have re-
ceived these u votes first and might have received u
from all Byzantine nodes, collecting in total 2f votes
for u. This is illustrated in Figure 2. Yet, as we as-
sumed that f < n/4, such a node must receive at
least f+1 votes for v and would therefore adopt v by
the AdoptionCriteria and start the base consensus
protocol with v.
In conclusion, all correct nodes would either decide
v in the optimizer phase, or would propose v in the
standard consensus algorithm. In the latter case, due
to its validity property, the decision value must also
be v. The complete formal proof appears below.
Lemma 4.3.1. The protocol listed in Algorithm 1
satisfies Byzantine termination as long as f < n/4.
Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of
Lemma 4.2.1.
Lemma 4.3.2. The protocol listed in Algorithm 1
satisfies Byzantine validity.
Proof. Clearly from the code, the value decided by a
correct node in Line 6 must be proposed by at least
one correct node given that f < n/4 and that in
Line 3 the node collects n− f votes. In particular, if
all correct nodes proposed the same value, this is the
only value that can be decided at this stage. Simi-
larly, if a value is adopted by the AdoptionCriteria,
it is also proposed by some correct node. Hence, all
invocations by correct nodes of the base consensus
protocol in Lines 9 or 11 are with values proposed
by some correct node. By the validity of the base
consensus protocol, overall validity is satisfied.
Lemma 4.3.3. The protocol listed in Algorithm 1
satisfies Byzantine agreement when f < n/4.
Proof. Since there is only one preferred value v, if all
correct nodes decide v in Line 6 then they all decide
on the same value (v). Similarly, if all correct nodes
decide by invoking the base consensus protocol in
Lines 9 or 11, then by the agreement property of this
protocol all correct nodes decide on the same value.
Hence, the only potential violation of agreement is
if some correct nodes decide in Line 6 while others
invoke the base consensus protocol in Lines 9 or 11.
Suppose correct node p decides in Line 6. In this
case, it has received at least n − f votes for v. Sup-
pose all missing votes are u and some other node q has
received these u votes. Further, the worst that can
happen is that among the n−f votes for v that p has
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received, f were sent by Byzantine nodes who send
the value u to q. Putting it all together, as f < n/4,
node q must receive at least f + 1 votes for v and
therefore would adopt v by the AdoptionCriteria.
As this applies to any q, all correct nodes that invoke
the base consensus protocol in Lines 9 or 11 invoke it
with v. Hence, by the validity property of this proto-
col only v can be decided so overall agreement is also
satisfied.
From Lemmas 4.3.1, 4.3.2 and 4.3.3, we immedi-
ately have the following theorem:
Theorem 4.3.1. The protocol listed in Algorithm 1
solves Byzantine consensus with classic validity when
up to f < n/4 nodes may incur Byzantine failures.
4.4 Byzantine Failures with External
Validity
We split the discussion of external validity into two
parts. First, we instantiate Algorithm 1 for this fail-
ure model in a manner that is oblivious to the proof
that each value may carry, which might affect how
the external validity function may decide if a value
is valid. This is done in Section 4.4.1. Next, in Sec-
tion 4.4.2 we present another optimization that can
reduce the amount of data being communicated in
the optimistic case by separating between values and
their proofs.
4.4.1 Proof Oblivious Protocol
Here, due to the use of an external validy function,
we can raise the resiliency level to f < n/3. This is
because if the preferred value v is valid, we can decide
on it even if it was proposed by any node, correct or
Byzantine. We make the following three assumptions:
Assumption 1 Any value u proposed by a correct
node is valid (both u = v and u 6= v are possible).
Assumption 2 The base consensus protocol satis-
fies classical validity (does not have to satisfy
external validity).
Assumption 3 Either (i) there are only two pos-
sible proposed and decision values (known also
as binary consensus), or (ii) the base consensus
protocol also satisfies external validity.
With these assumptions, the AdoptionCriteria be-
comes adopting v if v ∈ votes and v is valid.
Figure 3: A worst case scenario for the Byzantine
failure model with external validity and f < n/3. If
some node p decides after receiving n− f votes for v,
then any other node q must receive at least one vote
for v.
As shown in Figure 3, with n = 3f+1 it is possible
that some correct node receives n − f instances of
the preferred value v and some other correct process
only receives a single vote for v. However, in such a
case each correct process that does not decide in the
optimizer phase must adopt v and propose it to the
standard consensus protocol. Hence, the consensus
protocol must decide v. The complete formal proof
follows.
Lemma 4.4.1. The protocol listed in Algorithm 1
satisfies Byzantine termination as long as f < n/3.
Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of
Lemma 4.2.1.
Lemma 4.4.2. The protocol listed in Algorithm 1
satisfies Byzantine external validity.
Proof. Clearly from the code, the value decided by a
correct node in Line 6 must be proposed by at least
one correct node given that f < n/3 and that in
Line 3 the node collects n−f votes. By Assumption 1,
v is valid (w.r.t. external validity). Similarly, if the
value v is adopted by the AdoptionCriteria, it is
also valid. Hence, all invocations by correct nodes of
the base consensus protocol in Lines 9 or 11 are with
valid values.
We claim that from Assumption 3 (regarding the
base consensus protocol), overall validity is also satis-
fied. Suppose part (i) of this assumption holds. Then
if all correct nodes invoked the base consensus proto-
col with the same value (which we showed has to be
valid), then only this value can be decided. Other-
wise, some correct processes invoked consensus with
one value and the others with another, both have to
be valid, and these are the only two possible decision
values. Hence, only valid values can be decided on.
In case part (ii) holds, then by the external valid-
ity of the base consensus protocol, overall validity is
satisfied.
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Lemma 4.4.3. The protocol listed in Algorithm 1
satisfies Byzantine agreement when f < n/3.
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 4.3.3, since there is
only one preferred value v, if all correct nodes decide
v in Line 6 then they all decide on the same value (v).
Similarly, if all correct nodes decide by invoking the
base consensus protocol in Lines 9 or 11, then by the
agreement property of this protocol all correct nodes
decide on the same value. Hence, the only potential
violation of agreement is if some correct nodes de-
cide in Line 6 while others invoke the base consensus
protocol in Lines 9 or 11.
Suppose correct node p decides in Line 6. In this
case, it has received at least n−f votes for v meaning
that at least f + 1 correct nodes voted v. Suppose
all missing votes are u and some other node q has
received these u votes. Further, the worst that can
happen is that among the n − f votes for v that p
has received, f were sent by Byzantine nodes who
send the value u to q. Putting it all together, as
f < n/3, node q must receive at least one vote for v
from a correct node, which by Assumption 1 means
that v is valid, and therefore q would adopt v by the
AdoptionCriteria. As this applies to any q, all cor-
rect nodes that invoke the base consensus protocol in
Lines 9 or 11 invoke it with v. Hence, by the validity
property of this protocol (Assumption 2), only v can
be decided so overall agreement is also satisfied.
From Lemmas 4.4.1, 4.4.2 and 4.4.3, we immedi-
ately have the following theorem:
Theorem 4.4.1. The protocol listed in Algorithm 1
solves Byzantine consensus with external validity
when up to f < n/3 nodes may incur Byzantine fail-
ures.
4.4.2 Proof Aware Variant
We now explore another communication optimiza-
tion when the validity function depends on the cryp-
tographic proof that is part of the value. That
is, the initial value of each node is composed of
v = {val , proof }. As the proof is large and would
rarely be used, in the first phase we can send just
the value v.val ; only if any node needs to check the
AdoptionCriteria then nodes would exchange their
proofs v.proof . With the same Assumptions 1–3 and
AdoptionCriteria as in Section 4.4.1, the above de-
scribed proof aware protocol is listed in Algorithm 2.
As can be seen, the only difference between Algo-
rithm 1 and Algorithm 2 is that nodes initially only
Algorithm 2 Proof Aware Variant - code for p
1: procedure ComAwareConsensusv,Consensus,AdoptionCriteria(v′)
2: broadcast(v′.val)
3: wait until n− f proposals v̂al have been received
4: votes = {received proposals}
5: if votes = {v.val} then
6: Decide v.val
7: Return v.val
8: fullvals = {v′} . couldn’t terminate quickly; full
protocol
9: broadcast(v′) . exchange also the proofs
10: wait until |fullvals| = n− f . see also line 15
11: if fullvals matches AdoptionCriteria then
12: Return Consensus.Propose(v).val
13: else
14: Return Consensus.Propose(v′).val
15: upon receiving (vˆ) from q do:
16: fullvals = fullvals ∪ {vˆ}
17: send(v′) to q
18:
19: if invoked Decide v.val and some node invoked
Consensus.Propose(vˆ) then
20: Consensus.Propose(v) . this is executed at most once
exchange the value part of their proposal. Only if
it is not enough to decide, then they also exchange
the proofs and invoke the base consensus protocol
accordingly. The proof is essentially the same as in
Section 4.4.1.
5 Lower Bound
In this section, we show that for classical validity,
even when there is a preferred value v, there is no
asynchronous Byzantine consensus protocol that al-
ways terminates in a single round when all nodes start
with the preferred value v and there are no Byzantine
failures.
Theorem 5.0.1. When n = 3f + 1, there does not
exist an asynchronous Byzantine consensus proto-
col that always terminate in a single communication
round for nodes that receive messages from only n−f
nodes (or fewer) in that round and no Byzantine fail-
ures manifest even when there is a preferred value.
Proof. Assume by way of contradiction that such a
protocol P exists. Consider an execution σ1 of P in
which n−f = 2f +1 correct nodes start with a value
v while f additional nodes are Byzantine whom are
started with v, as illustrated in Figure 4. Consider a
correct node p1 that receives at most f + 1 messages
from correct nodes and at most f messages from the
Byzantine nodes, yet any message potentially sent by
8
Figure 4: Setup for lower bound proof.
the other nodes is not received by p1 until after time
t11 to be defined shortly. The f Byzantine processes
send to p1 the same messages they would have gener-
ated in P had they been started with v (so Byzantine
failures do not manifest in this execution). Since by
assumption when executing P node p1 must even-
tually decide without receiving additional messages,
then p1 must ultimately decide at time t
0
1 and we set
t01 < t
1
1. As all correct nodes started with v in σ1, p1
must have decided v in σ1.
Next, consider an execution σ2 in which all pro-
cesses that p1 did not receive their messages until
time t11 in σ1 are started with value u, the Byzantine
nodes send to p1 exactly the same messages as in σ1,
and up until time t11 all timings are identical to σ1.
Hence, up until time t01 node p1 cannot distinguish
between σ1 and σ2 and therefore must decide v in σ2
as well.
Further, in execution σ2 there is another correct
node p2 such that p2 does not receive any of the mes-
sages from a subset of f correct nodes that includes
p1 until after some time t
1
2 to be defined shortly. The
messages sent to p2 by the Byzantine nodes match
exactly their prescribed behavior in P had they been
started with u. Since we assume that P is an asyn-
chronous Byzantine agreement protocol, then even-
tually p2 must decide at some time t
0
2, and we set
t02 < t
1
2. Since p1 has decided v in σ2, by Byzantine
agreement p2 must also decide v in σ2.
Finally, consider a third execution σ3 of P in which
one of the f + 1 correct nodes that started with v
in σ2 is Byzantine in σ3, while all other nodes are
correct and start with u. Further, all timings are the
same between σ2 and σ3 up until time t
1
2. Hence,
p2 cannot distinguish between σ2 and σ3 up to time
t02 and therefore must decide v at time t
0
2. However,
all correct processes proposed u in σ3, a violation of
classical validity. A contradiction.
Notice that the above lower bound does not hold
if we allow nodes in Line 3 of Algorithm 1 to wait on
a timeout and at least n − f votes. In such a case,
a correct solution with f < n/3 is to decide on the
value v only if a node collects 3f + 1 votes and all
received votes are the same v while the adoption cri-
teria would be to adopt the value v if f + 1 values
are v. Yet, this solution only works when the net-
work is in a synchronous period and there is a known
upper bound for the usual message latency. Also, it
requires receiving messages from all nodes, meaning
that it always works at the paste of the slowest node.
Further, advancement to the base consensus protocol
in case a fast decision cannot be made always waits
for the worst case expected network latency.
6 Discussion
In this work, we explored the communication ben-
efits of biasing consensus into preferring a specific
decision value whenever that value can be decided
on while preserving the standard consensus correct-
ness requirements. To that end, we have presented
a generic optimizer code that can take an arbitrary
consensus protocol and optimize it so that when-
ever some favorable conditions occur, then the pro-
tocol terminates in a single all-to-all communication
round. Locally, the favorable conditions are that the
first n − f values a given node receives are all the
same preferred value v. Globally, if this occurs for
all correct processes, then all correct processes ter-
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minate quickly and efficiently. This is regardless of
any timing assumptions and reliability assumptions
(other than that the network cannot generate or mod-
ify messages), and regardless of any oracles etc.
In practice, our favorable conditions will hold, e.g.,
whenever all nodes start with the same value and
no Byzantine failures manifest. Yet, up to f be-
nign failures can still occur, and the instantiations
of the generic construction to the Byzantine failure
mode ensure correctness even when Byzantine fail-
ure do occur (when Byzantine failures do occur, this
may induce extra communication costs). As we men-
tioned before, guessing the preferred consensus value
can be done, e.g., in several recent blockchain proto-
cols [6, 7, 11] (here the biased value is to approve the
leader’s block proposal), in strongly consistent pri-
mary backup replication [17] (here the biased value
is to accept the master’s most recent update), and
in various control systems [23]. In case the guessed
preferred value cannot be decided on (a “bad guess”),
the only harm is additional communication rounds.
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